18 Aircraft, 18 Mines - Churchill, Operation Paul and the sinking of HMS Glorious, Ardent & Acasta

By Ben Barker

On the 8th June 1940, the British aircraft carrier HMS Glorious and her two destroyer escorts, HMS Ardent and Acasta were sunk, returning home from Norway, by the German battlecruisers; Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. 1,519 British and Maltese sailors, marines and airmen died in the Royal Navy’s worst loss of WWII.

The whys and wherefores surrounding the loss of the ships have perplexed us all for nearly eighty years. Nothing about the official account quite adds up.

Why was Glorious alone and so lightly protected?

Why didn’t she engage the one weapon capable of attacking the Germans, her aircraft?

Was Glorious’ captain both deranged and responsible?

Why has the bravery of the two destroyers and their David and Goliath battle to protect Glorious never been properly recognised.

What has the Royal Navy and successive governments been hiding for so long?

The Story

Churchill famously said

“In war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies”.

In June 1940, in the midst of Churchill’s darkest hour, it made perfect sense for Britain to cover her tracks over an attack on neutral Sweden, but it surely doesn’t now.

Without credible answers to all these questions, I decided to try and make sense of things. I readily admit the jigsaw may be missing a few pieces but nonetheless a discernible picture has emerged. It’s a story of immense bravery that has never been told before.

Having read an earlier draft of this website, Andrew Lambert, Professor of Naval History, at King's College London, agreed, saying:

“As I read it the probability of your version is too high to be mere coincidence, all the pieces line up and the men are all meeting in the right order. It is about time this gap in the record was closed”

The mystery is not the battle itself, the first between an aircraft carrier & battleships, and caught on film by German newsreel, but why Glorious Ardent & Acasta were alone when the enemy struck.

Should you contact The UK’s Ministry of Defence, they will tell you, as they always have done, Glorious was taking part in the evacuation of forces from Norway. She was an old ship, short of fuel, and left the protection of the returning convoy, with only the destroyers Ardent & Acasta as escort, because she couldn’t wait any longer. The problem with this is no one has ever believed the MoD. Churchill himself described the explanation as unconvincing but then again, as the architect of Glorious’, Ardent & Acasta’s demise, he knew the truth.

My grandfather, Lt. Cdr. J. F. “Ben” Barker DSC, was the captain of HMS Ardent. He and Cdr. Charles Glasfurd, HMS Acasta’s commanding officer, were both recommended for posthumous Victoria Crosses, the UK military’s highest gallantry award, for their part in the battle against Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, a detail dear to me but very much lost in the cover-up of the truth. I say cover-up, because that is what it has happened since 8th June 1940.

The Navy’s cursory board of enquiry into the loss of the ships was marked closed until 2041. The Admiral who ordered the three ships home was not interviewed nor is his RoP (Report of proceedings) anywhere to be found. The enquiry concluded the dead Captain of HMS Glorious was to blame, had he survived he would almost certainly have been court-martialled. The Admiralty turned a deaf-ear to anyone who asked questions. The head of the civil service’s military branch advised against any public report. The VC recommendations were turned down. Churchill and the Admiralty wanted the story buried.

With so many doubting the shortage of fuel story, another, uglier, version of events grew, culminating in a very public article published in the Sunday Times Review on 15th June 1980. Written by Captain Stephen Roskill, author of the official naval history of WWII. The newspaper headline screamed “The Cantankerous Captain of HMS Glorious - How the navy covered up the truth about the sinking of an aircraft carrier”. Roskill set about destroying the reputation of Guy D’Oyly-Hughes, the captain of HMS Glorious and much decorated hero of WWI.

Roskill believed a disagreement between D’Oyly-Hughes and his senior flying officers led to him requesting permission to return home ahead of the convoy, not because of a shortage of fuel, but in order to court-marshal an officer he’d put ashore, under house arrest, in the Orkneys for cowardice in the face of the enemy.

Was Roskill right? D’Oyly-Hughes did indeed fall out with his two senior flying officers but would he really have been given permission to put a fully-laden aircraft carrier and two destroyers at risk, to settle an argument with one man, when Britain was on the brink of invasion? This was June 1940, Britain’s darkest hour; the month we evacuated Dunkirk & Norway, Italy declared war and France capitulated.

The demonisation of D’Oyly-Hughes has always been convenient because it drew attention away from anyone discovering what I believe is the real reason the ships were lost: Churchill’s Operation Paul.

Operation Paul

A bellicose Churchill returned to the Admiralty as First Lord (Political head of the Royal Navy) at the outbreak of war, in September 1939. The fanfare “Winston is Back!” was signalled to every ship in the fleet. Churchill wasted no time in making plans to have a go the enemy.

In 1939, 82% of Germany’s Iron ore imports, for steel making, came from Sweden. Churchill was convinced if these supplies could be cut off, the war might be greatly foreshortened. With the help of strategist and minelaying expert, Admiral Reggie Drax, he came up with Operation Catherine, named after Catherine the Great of Russia. The plan was to send old but heavily modified battleships into the Baltic to wreak havoc and sink ore carriers. The modifications proved beyond the already overstretched British shipyards, and in January 1940, Catherine was dropped.

It wasn’t long before Churchill and Drax were at it again. This time the plan was simpler, Churchill named the sequel; Operation Paul (After Catherine’s eldest son, Paul I).

Aircraft, launched from carriers sitting off the north Norwegian coast, would fly across the Scandinavian peninsula to lay mines, blocking ore exports from the neutral Swedish Baltic port of Lulea. Lulea was ice-bound every year until late May, so the operation would have to wait for the thaw in early June 1940.

Narvik and Lulea - the Norwegian & Swedish iron ore ports connected by railway

Whilst Churchill recounts Operation Catherine at length in his memoirs, strangely, he makes no mention of Operation Paul. In fact, Operation Paul seems to have been almost entirely forgotten by historians. Only two have ever written about it; Professor Thomas Munch-Petersen and Captain Peter Hore RN. Neither account connects Operation Paul to the loss of Glorious, Ardent & Acasta.

Operation Paul first emerged in the War Cabinet minutes of March 1940. By 16th April 1940 the Swedes were aware of British plans and naturally apprehensive. When Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, asked what form his apprehension might take, Bjorn Prytz (Swedish Envoy in London) replied;

“Oh I don’t know. They think that you would fly aeroplanes over from Narvik and sow mines in the Gulf of Bothnia”

7th May 1940

Having lost Glorious’ sister ship HMS Courageous to U-boat attack just two weeks after war was declared in 1939, the Navy had three aircraft carriers in Home Fleet in June 1940, Glorious, her other sister-ship Furious and the brand new HMS Ark Royal.

On Tuesday 7th May 1940, three days before he became Prime Minister, Churchill called a “Fleet Air Arm Conference” in one of his last acts a First Lord of the Admiralty. This is recorded in the First Lord’s official diary for 5.30pm with a question mark in brackets. The exact time of the conference may have been in question as it coincided with the beginning of a two day Commons debate into Britain’s disastrous Norwegian campaign against Germany, culminating in Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain’s resignation.

Churchill’s First Lord of The Admiralty Diary Entry for 7th May 1940 – Fleet Air Arm Conference

Summoned to the conference from his ship berthed on the Clyde in Scotland was Captain Guy D’Oyly-Hughes DSO & Bar, DSC, the commanding officer of HMS Glorious, a dashing maverick and highly decorated war hero, best friend to Admiral Reggie Drax, Churchill’s Operation Paul planning partner and godfather to Drax’s eldest son, Walter.

On the day of the conference the two men lunched together at D’Oyly-Hughes’ London home before travelling to meet Churchill at the Admiralty. Bridget, Guy D’Oyly-Hughes’ daughter, remembers the day well. She was seventeen, learning to drive and after lunch gave him a lift to the Admiralty. It was the last she would spend with her father.

Born to British parents in Salt Lake City, Utah, USA, D’Oyly-Hughes grew up amongst the “Cowboys and Indians” of America’s Midwest. As a young twenty four year old Lieutenant in First World War, he swam ashore, raft of explosives in tow, climbed a cliff, single-handedly blew up the Constantinople –Baghdad railway before swimming back to his waiting submarine . His party trick, in Malta, was to dive from the full height of Glorious’ flight deck into the Grand harbour. He taught Lord Louis Mountbatten to water-ski in full dress uniform, gliding into shore, Bond-like and bone dry, for beachside cocktail parties. D’Oyly-Hughes kept a loaded revolver on the bridge of the ship for “Any man who failed in his duty” and a pet Chihuahua and yellow Canary in his cabin. When he took command of Glorious, his wife wrote a letter to one of his senior officers saying:

“Please be forbearing with Guy won’t you, for sometimes he says and does things which seem quite mad”.

D’Oyly-Hughes and Drax were just the sort of like-minded men whose company Churchill found exhilarating. Their coming together brings to mind a very familiar fictional triumvirate: Drax, Ian Fleming’s friend, whom he named his Moonraker Bond villain Hugo Drax after, was the “Q” type figure, full of ideas for new and different tactics/weapons/machines, some which had yet to be invented. Churchill, to all intents and purposes “M” and the daring D’Oyly-Hughes might have made the perfect James Bond. It’s not overstating it to say; if ever there was a man with the courage and determination to take on Churchill’s Operation Paul, it was Guy D’Oyly-Hughes.

A 24 year old Guy D’Oyly Hughes pictured in a reconstruction of the raft and explosives he used to blow up the Constantinople-Baghdad Railway in 1915.

Whilst in London to meet Churchill, D’Oyly-Hughes also tried, unsuccessfully, to replace the man in charge of flying in Glorious, Commander JB (John Benjamin) Heath. D’Oyly-Hughes and Heath did not get on. Many years later, Admiral Sir William Davis would write:

“D’Oyly Hughes was known to be a very difficult headstrong chap. But alas Heath was not by a long chalk in the Fleet Air Arm First X1. Mentally and character-wise Heath was no flier and the last person in the world to put alongside D’Oyly-Hughes”.

8th May 1940

12+ 6=18 (18 Swordfish aeroplanes)

“Six aircraft of 823 Squadron will presumably be fitted with these tanks” - “VAA’s only to Glorious” and “12 sets are held in Glorious”

These are the key sections of the above signal, sent from HMS Glorious the day after D’Oyly-Hughes’ meeting with Churchill in London. VAA stands for Vice Admiral Air and refers to Vice Admiral Lionel “Nutty” Wells, D’Oyly-Hughes’ boss, and the man who, one month later, would give the order for Glorious, Ardent & Acasta to leave the safety of the convoy on the 8th June 1940.

The 12 sets refer to the long-range fuel tanks needed to give Glorious’ Swordfish aircraft the extra reach to carry out Operation Paul. Admiral Wells ordered the fuel tanks “Only to Glorious” and not to the two other aircraft carriers operating off Norway; Ark Royal and Furious.

The signal confirms 12 sets of fuel tanks were being held in Glorious plus the 6 more to be fitted to the aircraft of Glorious’ 823 Squadron, (Temporarily put ashore in the Orkneys to make way for the RAF fighters being ferried by Glorious to Norway) giving a total of 18.

One month later, 18 would become a highly significant number for Churchill, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound and Vice Admiral Lionel Wells.

Admirals in the Navy are a bit like royalty, when they’re onboard a ship they fly their flag and supersede the authority of the ship’s captain. Vice Admiral Wells was in charge of the three Home Fleet three aircraft carriers and spent much of the Norwegian Campaign at sea in HMS Ark Royal.

The signal illustrates Wells wasn’t just a figurehead but very much a hands-on fighting commander, with a real grasp for detail as to what each ship had onboard in terms of weapons, machinery and men. Churchill, on the other hand, was focused on the bigger picture.

10th May 1940

On Friday 10th May 1940, Churchill became Britain’s new Prime Minister, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, his First Sea Lord, the professional head of the Navy. Pound became known as Churchill’s Anchor. His strategy was never to blunt Churchill’s enthusiasm, but instead go along with some of the wilder ideas in the hope they’d naturally fizzle out, as for instance Operation Catherine had.

Churchill and First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound.

14th May 1940

Planting vegetables

On the 14th May 1940, four days into his premiership, Churchill gave instructions for plans to be prepared to enable Operation Paul to be put into action within three weeks (Early June). Churchill wrote to his military chief staff officer, General Hastings Lionel “Pug” Ismay;

“Bring to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff the importance of planting vegetables (cucumber shaped mines) in the approaches to Lulea. This is one of the most important objects for which we have gone to Narvik (Norway). Let a good plan be ready to be used in about three weeks. When it is ready I will bring it before the Cabinet myself”

General Hastings Lionel “Pug” Ismay (November 1940 © National Portrait Gallery)

A three man joint service planning team for Operation Paul came together in Whitehall; Captain Charles Daniel (Royal Navy), Major General Ian Playfair (Army), Air Commodore John “Jack” Slessor (Royal Air Force).

Historian, Captain John Creswell, is quoted as saying;

In 1940-41 when Winston was bored of those old fogies the chiefs of staff (in his view) he used to ask the directors of plans, Charles Daniel, Ian Playfair and Jack Slessor to stay the night at Chequers hoping to suborn them from their true allegiance. After the third glass of vintage port, he would say “Good port this, we’ll make a first-rate plan on this”.

17th May 1940

Operation Bottle

The test run for Operation Paul was appropriately named Operation Bottle and is the next piece of the HMS Glorious/Operation Paul jigsaw. The six Swordfish aircraft of Glorious’s 823 Squadron, (referred to in the signal sent the day after Churchill’s Fleet Air Arm conference) now fitted with long-range fuel tanks and mines took off from Royal Naval Air Station, Hatston, in the Orkney Islands, on the night of 17th May 1940, headed for the Norwegian port of Stavanger.

Swordfish flying above the clouds - Courtesy of Brian Reeves

It’s worth pausing for a second to try and imagine the difficulty of this operation. Swordfish were slow and ponderous biplanes with open cockpits and rudimentary navigation. They were flying over the North Sea, at night, without the relative safety net of an aircraft carrier to return to. The middle seat of each aeroplane, normally housing the navigator/observer was now occupied by a large drum of aviation fuel to give the aircraft the range they needed, with the navigator bumped into the third, rear gunner’s seat. Aerial mining was a brand new form of warfare and this was the first time these crews had dropped mines in anger. Two men and two aircraft were lost during the operation, they ran out of engine oil on the way home, crashing into the sea, but it was enough to convince Churchill and Dudley Pound that Operation Paul was viable.

Hatston (Orkneys) and Stavanger (Norway) are marked on this map

23rd May 1940

A week later on 23rd May 1940 Churchill was pushing again:

We should take every advantage of our position in Northern Norway to mine the approaches to Lulea to the maximum possible extent.

With rapid German advances into the Low Countries and France and the very real threat of a UK invasion, late May early June 1940 brought the withdrawal of allied forces from both France (Dunkirk) and Norway (Narvik) to defend Britain from invasion.

24th May 1940

The following day, 24th May 1940, Churchill wrote again to his Chief of Staff, General Pug Ismay;

Before Narvik is evacuated, it is essential that the largest number of mines should be laid in the approaches to Lulea. Let a plan be prepared for laying these by flights from aircraft carriers.

And then at the Defence Committee meeting on the same day (24th May 1940) Churchill makes the same point;

The Prime Minister urged that every effort should be made to carry out Operation Paul. No political considerations should stand in the way of this operation (Swedish neutrality). The operation should begin just before the end of the evacuation from Narvik. The committee agreed on 24th May regarding Operation Paul: Aircraft being withdrawn, if necessary, from among those now operating from shore bases in south east England.

26th May 1940

Heath and D’Oyly-Hughes

Meanwhile, off the Norwegian coast in HMS Glorious, during the night of 26th and the following day, 27th May 1940, Captain Guy D’Oyly-Hughes and his Commander Flying JB Heath had a major fall-out over what D’Oyly-Hughes must have seen as a dry run for Operation Paul and Heath’s view that the attack he was being asked to mount was an unsuitable use of naval aircraft.

The mission required fitting long distance tanks to Glorious’s Swordfish aircraft and taking the ship to within 30 miles of the Norwegian coast, putting her within easy range of the Luftwaffe. Operation Paul would mirror these exact requirements. JB Heath’s reluctance must have left D’Oyly-Hughes to conclude Heath would be incapable of carrying out orders for Operation Paul. It was the final straw for the unfortunate Heath who, unlikely to have known anything about Operation Paul, was put ashore at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys, to face court martial for “Cowardice in the face of the enemy”.

One of the last photographs of HMS Glorious, camouflaged and in murky weather.

The Darkest Hour

Glorious’s final run to Norway saw her return to help evacuate the 18,000 strong allied force. There she joined company with Ark Royal and a number of cruisers, destroyers and merchantmen.

The end of May and beginning of June 1940 also brought warnings of increased radio traffic from the German naval base of Kiel, home to the battlecruisers; Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The daily warnings to the Admiralty came from a fledgling Bletchley Park. The warnings went unheeded. The Admiralty thought they knew best. Some years later, the man sending those warnings, Bletchley cryptanalyst, Sir Harry Hinsley, remarked;

“With the loss of Glorious there came a turning point in relations between Bletchley Park and the Admiralty”.

Hinsley was right of course, the Germans had put to sea, fog helped ensure RAF reconnaissance flights over the area were unaware of their departure. The Germans named theirs; Operation Juno. Their targets were allied shipping in the Harstad area of Northern Norway.

Harry Hinsley – Cryptographer, Bletchley Park

The Preparatory Order

At this early point of the war, it is fair to say all was not well at the Admiralty. Captain John Lichfield RN, many years later wrote to Professor Arthur J. Marder, recalling his time as a member of the joint planning staff during the Norwegian Campaign:

“I hope you will let me see your paper on Winston and Norway when it is finished as this was one of the most curious and controversial episodes of the war. I still believe that although the chiefs of staff made a fearful mess of it, they were pushed and prodded into unsound decisions by Churchill. I myself joined the Joint Planning staff just as it was beginning and believe me, it was Bedlam. Nobody seemed to know what was going to happen next as orders, counter orders and counter-counter orders chased each other at high level and Roger Keyes (Former Admiral of the Fleet) and co. whispered ideas into Winston’s ear! It really was an example of how not to run a shop.

The planning for Operation Paul came under the same staff. The chopping and changing over the next few days would bear out Capt. Lichfield’s view.

5th June 1940

On the 5th June 1940 at 1655 a lengthy signal from First Sea Lord, Dudley Pound, was sent to the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles “Wrong Way” Forbes and Vice Admiral Air Lionel “Nutty” Wells in HMS Ark Royal off the Norwegian coast (in company with Glorious). The Admiralty signal began;

Preparations are to be put in hand for carrying out Operation Paul as soon as possible on the completion of Operation Alphabet (the Allied withdrawal from Norway) using “Ark Royal and Furious”.

( ii) Following squadrons will be available – 800, 803,810 820, all already embarked. 821 ex Hatston, and 812, 816 and 818 at present operating under Coastal Command. The fighters are for carrier protection.

(iii) Mines and aircraft will be embarked at Clyde except for 821 Squadron which will be embarked from Hatston (Orkneys).

(iv) Plan is to be modified as follows (a) Torpedoes are not repetition not to be used (b) Fighters will not repetition accompany TSRs (c) Pamphlets will not repetition be dropped

(v) Further signal follows regarding 812, 816 and 818 Squadrons.

No mention then of Glorious (apart from her own 812 Squadron) but the planning for Operation Paul would change again rapidly over the following 72 hours.

Glorious, originally involved, appears to have been dropped from the operation with a reduction from three to two aircraft carriers taking part. Plans to drop pamphlets warning neutral Swedes an attack was imminent had been cancelled. Churchill’s view was attack now, apologise later. The plan would change again the following day with Pound reducing the operation further, to one carrier and 18 aircraft taking part instead of the original 60 planned.

825 squadron alone had lost 8 of its 12 aircraft during the evacuation of Dunkirk. The Navy now had a total of 75 Swordfish aircraft in service & as the locations below show, they were scattered around the UK, mainly on the south coast. To send 60 of them to mine Swedish waters, with heavy losses/internment expected was completely unrealistic given the threat of invasion.

On 3rd June 1940 the humiliation of the Dunkirk was complete. Churchill wanted to bounce back immediately and take the fight to the Germans. By the 5th June 1940 he was building up a head of steam over Operation Paul. It was now or never. Private Secretary to Churchill, John “Jock” Colville recorded his thoughts in what would later become The Colville Diaries.

His diary entry for 5th June 1940 reads:

Winston is still full of offensive zeal….
The Germans today have begun a great offensive towards Paris, being anxious no doubt to allow our routed armies no respite.

6th June 1940

And again the following day, on the 6th June 1940 Colville wrote;

The war has now, for the first time, become the question of permanent importance for the average Englishman.
Dined with Lady Wolverton. The Dutch Minister and his wife were also there, also Sir George Clerk. The latter said in order to wage war Democracies had to convert themselves to Dictatorships.
The PM went to a cinema to see the Dunkerque film (Evacuation) and returned to Admiralty House in rather a bad temper. He was cross with the French.
The PM was in an impatient frame of mind. He was angry with the First Sea Lord (Dudley Pound) who is being excessively cautious about Winston’s cherished “Operation Paul” which is to interrupt, by mine laying, the Lulea iron ore traffic.

Isn’t it odd that Operation Paul, a plan so “cherished” by Churchill fails to get a mention in his memoirs?

Churchill’s Anchor

There’s another clue in Colville’s diary entry; Pound’s excessive caution. Robin Broadhurst’s biography of Pound is titled “Churchill’s Anchor”. In it, he says:

Pound would probably concede that he had seen off Churchill’s Operation Catherine which was almost Kamikaze in its approach.

David Irving in his book “Churchill’s War - The struggle for Power” agrees;

Churchill’s battery of weapons (Wrote Admiral John Godfrey, director of naval Intelligence) included persuasion, real or simulated anger, mockery, vituperation, tantrums, ridicule, derision, abuse and tears.

Admiral Godfrey dryly recalled that when Mr Churchill became their chief they found that

He lived largely on an exotic diet of the carcasses of abortive and wildcat operations. The First Sea Lord (Dudley Pound) was prepared to indulge him, but it involved setting up duplicate planning, operational and Intelligence staffs.

Now faced with actually having to mount Operation Paul, would Pound risk the only three carriers he had to protect home waters? or was he quietly planning, in duplicate, to minimise the risk and give Churchill one carrier, and if so which one?

A clue to his thinking may lie in a letter Dudley Pound wrote, a few days before the outbreak of war, in September1939 and his thoughts, then, on how long HMS Glorious might survive;

When we attack Italy itself….then I think there is a great deal to be said for making an attack by air on the Italian fleet at Taranto. One reason for this is that I do not believe Glorious will be able to remain in a serviceable condition in the Mediterranean for very long, what with air and submarine attack, and it may be a good thing to get the most one can out of her before she is placed hors de combat (out of action).

At the War Cabinet meeting on 5th June 1940, First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound reported to Churchill on the progress of Operation Paul;

“Sixty Swordfish have been fitted with extra tanks – The extra tanks gave an endurance of 600 miles or more”.
“A short time ago these aircraft, working from Hatston (In the Orkney Islands) fitted with the extra tanks carried out a mine laying operation in The Stavanger area. The distance from Hatston and back again was 510 miles.”

Dudley Pound’s statement again highlights the misleading way in which information was being shared and the duplicate planning David Irving points to above. The carrier force had already been reduced from three to two and would shortly be reduced again to one. 60 Swordfish would reduce to 18. “A short time ago…” was in fact three weeks before. 60 was actually 6.

The operation Dudley Pound was referring to was Operation Bottle, flown by Glorious’ s aircraft, and had taken place on the night of the 17/18th May 1940. When it came to Operation Paul, nothing, it seems, was set in stone except Churchill’s determination to see it happen.

On the 6th June 1940 Churchill again, in one his famous “prayers” wrote to Dudley Pound:

The greatest importance is attached to the Operation Paul. Pray let me have a report of how this is progressing and when it is intended to begin.

This time, just 24hrs after he had said “Sixty aircraft have been fitted with extra tanks”, Pound’s reply to Churchill is a little more realistic:

I am of the opinion however that the operation should now be confined to mining the channels where a “block” will occur if a ship is mined there. For the above, 18 mines would be required. Having flown off the 18 machines, the carrier would clear out and the 18 machines would make a forced landing in the sea at a pre-arranged rendezvous and the crews be picked up by small craft, the machines being abandoned.

7th June 1940

On the 7th June 1940 Dudley Pound again wrote to Churchill:

Ark Royal* will embark mines and refuel as soon as she reaches (Scapa crossed out) the Clyde after the evacuation (Of Norway) is complete and then carry out Paul at once in the modified form.

(*Wrong ship I hear you say – I will come to this – the important words are “carry out Paul at once”)

Ark Royal (foreground) and Glorious (courtesy of Brian Reeves GLARAC)

Evacuation from Norway

The evacuation brought with it the rescue of Norway’s King Haakon VII, his family and cabinet. The royal court had been on the run from German advances north in Norway for some weeks. With them were tons of gold bullion and cash, all of which was sent in separate shipments to the UK.

On the 7th June 1940, the cruiser, HMS Devonshire, was ordered to embark the Norwegian party from Tromso and return to the UK immediately, at full speed and in radio silence. The Norwegians had the largest merchant fleet in the world, their ships were desperately needed by the British.

King Haakon VII of Norway (left) and Crown Prince Olav photographed en-route to the UK onboard HMS Devonshire 8th June 1940

By the 7th June 1940 Scharnhorst and Gneisenau’ s advance northwards had been seen spotted by Norwegian coastal watchers who reported their sightings to the RAF contingent at Bardufoss airfield. Schneider Trophy winning pilot; Wing Commander Dick “Batchy” Atcherley’s parting shot, whilst hastily packing his bags to evacuate; “Watch out for the bloody battleships”. He assumed the Navy were aware of their presence and didn’t relay the Norwegian warnings to the Admiralty.

Scharnhorst & Gneisenau - © Bundesarchiv,

The events of the night of the 7th - 8th June 1940 are key to this story. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were by now closing in on the evacuating forces off Northern Norway, warnings from Bletchley Park and the Norwegians had gone awry. The Navy kept a tight lid on its plans for the evacuation. Admirals were not fully in synch with each other’s plans. RAF Coastal Command, who could have provided air cover for the evacuation, had been sidelined and rumour of a German break-out into the Atlantic had sent big-gunned British battleships, more than a match for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, scurrying northwards towards the Iceland/Faroes gap, in the wrong direction and under the command of the aptly, in this case, but somewhat cruelly nicknamed, Commander in Chief Home Fleet; Sir Charles “Wrong Way” Forbes.

Meanwhile, in London, Churchill was pushing his First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, to make Operation Paul happen. The timing and the wording the next signal from London is telling, it comes at quarter to one in the morning.

8th June 1940

At 0043 on Saturday 8th June 1940 the following signal was sent by the Admiralty to Charles Forbes, C-in-C Home Fleet and Lionel Wells Vice Admiral Air (In Ark Royal), it read:

From: Admiralty***0043 Part 1. The greatest importance is attached to operation PAUL
but as –

(i)No (repetition No) aerodrome will be available in Norway,

(ii) The radius of action when working from a Carrier of Swordfish with extra tanks has proved to be 250 miles

(iii) There is a great risk to carriers if they remain for several hours off Norwegian Coast. It has been decided that it must be carried out on a reduced scale as follows:-

Part 2 follows 0013/8

My 0043 part 2

(a) 18 aircraft equipped with mines to fly off ARK ROYAL in vicinity of VEST FIJORD.

(b) ARK ROYAL then to retire to westward at full speed

(c) Aircraft, after laying mines to land in sea at various points off coast of Norway where small craft would be in attendance. This operation should be carried out as soon as possible after completion of ALPHABET (The evacuation of Norway).

If VAA (Wells) after recent experience in Norway considers ARK ROYAL can maintain a position which would enable returning aircraft to land on the ship, request you amend paragraphs 3(b) and (c) accordingly.

Wells’ Decision

The 0043 signal to Admiral Wells in Ark Royal gave him a real dilemma. He now had two operations to deal with; Operation Alphabet (The evacuation of allied forces from Norway) and Operation Paul . The window of opportunity for Operation Paul was tiny. Once the British evacuation was discovered, German forces, in particular the Luftwaffe, would quickly move further north in Norway filling the vacuum left by the allies. It was now or never for Operation Paul.

Wells had two aircraft carriers at his disposal. One had to remain with and protect the returning convoy, the other could be dispatched for Paul, both would have to return to the UK first. Why? Because neither ship had the trained Operation Paul aircrews, aerial mines or required 18 long-range fuel tanks onboard.

Glorious in use as transport for RAF aircraft was no good to Wells, she could not fulfil the convoy protection role because she had only a fraction of her own aircraft onboard. The RAF aeroplanes could not operate from the carrier. Ark Royal with a near full complement of her own aircraft but without the trained pilots, long range fuel tanks or mines was the obvious choice to remain with and protect the returning convoy.

Glorious was also a twenty three year old ship, Ark Royal was brand new having only been in service for eighteen months. Let’s put ourselves in Wells’ shoes and recap the evidence;

Glorious’ Captain: On 7th May 1940 D’Oyly-Hughes, the captain of Glorious, is summoned from Scotland to a conference with Churchill. Neither Admiral Wells or the Captain of Ark Royal were invited. They were at sea, off the coast of Norway.

Glorious’ signal: On 8th May, the day after the conference, Glorious signaled the Admiralty confirming she had 12 sets of long range fuel tanks onboard and a further 6 of her aircraft from 823 Squadron, based in the Orkneys, would be fitted with the tanks. Giving the total, so important to this story, of 18. Wells, himself, ordered the fuel tanks “only to Glorious”.

Glorious’ aircraft: On the night of the 17th May those 6 aircraft from Glorious’ 823 Squadron carry out the test run for Operation Paul, codenamed Operation Bottle.

Glorious’ dry run: On the 26th May D’Oyly-Hughes attempts a dry run for Operation Paul by fitting long range tanks to aircraft and bringing Glorious into within 30 miles of the Norwegian coast but the mission is blocked by the Commander Flying in the ship; JB Heath. D’Oyly-Hughes puts Heath ashore, under house arrest, pending court martial for cowardice in the face of the enemy.

As I’ve already said, Glorious was on old ship, if you had to risk losing one, which would you choose? Despite the Admiralty naming Ark Royal in their signal as the designated carrier for Operation Paul Wells knew what he needed to protect the troop convoy and what he could make available. He was the one being asked to make the decision. Churchill and Pound wanted a carrier they didn’t care which one. Naming Ark Royal and not Glorious in their 0043 signal has actually always been a stroke of luck for the Admiralty in covering up the truth. Or was it luck? Captain Peter Hore RN says in his own Operation Paul paper:

Signal logs of that time have not, generally, been kept, but the preparatory, the executive signal and an amending signal are rare survivals to be found spread between papers in the collection of the Admiralty Library and a file at Kew which belonged to the War Office.

I am going to go out on a limb and ask the question, can we trust the authenticity of these signals when all the evidence points to Glorious and not Ark Royal.

It’s the immediate movements of the two ships following the signal which makes it quite clear the choice Wells made. HMS Glorious immediately left the protection of the convoy because Wells chose and ordered her to carry out Operation Paul.

Glorious at high speed in May 1940, flying off Hurricanes to join allied forces in Norway

The Hurricanes

Whilst Wells pondered his fateful decision, one of the most daring flying feats of the war was taking place.

A few weeks earlier Glorious had delivered the Hurricanes of RAF 46 Squadron to their base in Norway. Now, with the evacuation nearing completion, what were the RAF to do with their desperately needed Hurricanes? Three options were available:

Burn them.

Fly them out to the carriers, ditch in the sea and hope the pilots would survive long enough to be picked up.

Or, for the first time ever, try to land high performance aircraft on a carrier without the aid of arrester wires/hooks.

Engineers at Farnborough said it couldn’t be done because the flight decks of both Glorious & Ark Royal weren’t long enough. Faced with the thought of burning his beloved Hurricanes, Squadron Leader Kenneth “Bing” Cross felt they had nothing to lose but to try. Glorious was chosen because she had the wider lifts allowing the fixed-winged Hurricanes to be stowed below in the hangar.

Cross ordered the Hurricanes’ tyres to be partially deflated and a sand bag wedged into each tail plane. The first three Hurricanes followed a Swordfish guiding them some 60 miles out to the carrier. So slow was the pace, the Hurricanes behind struggled not to stall. One pilot described it as trying to land on the back of a moving elephant. To aid them, D’Oyly Hughes ordered Glorious to increase to full speed (30 knots). The final Hurricane landed on at approximately 2am on the 8th June 1940. One hour and 17 minutes after the Admiralty had signal ordered Admiral Wells to begin Operation Paul.

Squadron Leader Kenneth “Bing” Cross – C/O of 46 Squadron - RAF

The welcome D’Oyly-Hughes gave to Cross when he reported to the ship’s bridge was not very gracious “What took you so long!” is what he said but was he just being rude or was he in a desperate hurry to get away for Operation Paul?

Glorious’s departure coincides with another theory as to why she left the safety of the returning convoy that night. John Winton, author of “Carrier Glorious” and unaware of Operation Paul, wrote in his book;

It seemed that D’Oyly-Hughes had a pressing reason for impatience and was eager to return to Scapa Flow. At about 02:25 on the 8th June 1940 Commander le Geyt in HMS Diana noticed a signalling lamp in Glorious, calling up Ark Royal. The request was for permission to part company and proceed ahead to Scapa Flow for the purpose of making preparations for impending courts-martial.

There is no reason not to believe Le Geyt’s account of events but was the court martial of Heath really the pressing reason or was it Operation Paul?

HMS Glorious on 7th June 1940, the day before she was sunk. Picture taken from the flight deck of HMS Ark Royal. The ship in between the two carriers is HMS Diana, captained by Commander Edward Le Geyt.

Dick Leggott, a fighter pilot in Glorious and not, by his own admission, a huge fan of JB Heath, put the court martial signal down to D’Oyly-Hughes’ dark sense of humour. Maybe he had a point. We know D’Oyly-Hughes was a signposter; the loaded revolver he kept on the bridge for any man who failed in his duty being one of them. What better way (Having made an example of Heath) to put down a marker to the rest of his ship’s company was there than the threat of court martial? D’Oyly-Hughes certainly couldn’t afford a repeat of Heath’s doubts when it came to Operation Paul. Did it serve D’Oyly-Hughes’ purposes to use the court martial as code between himself and Admiral Wells for Operation Paul?

Cdr. Le Geyt, in fact, refers to the signal reading “courts martial” plural. The only other officer in line for court martial was Heath’s number two - Lt. Cdr. Paul Slessor. Was D’Oyly-Hughes playing a psychological game with names and codes?

In Ark Royal’s decklog there are two entries for single Swordfish landings from Glorious in the run up to the 8th June 1940.

Firstly, at 16.55 on the 5th June 1940 (leaving 43mins later). This coincides with the preparatory order signal for Operation Paul sent on the same day from the Admiralty at 15.28 to Admiral Wells in Ark Royal.

The second on the 7th June 1940. The Swordfish from Glorious landed on at 14.40 and flew off 54mins later, at 15.34. Were these visits for meetings between D’Olyly- Hughes and Wells to discuss the evacuation and preparations for Operation Paul?

I don’t think for a moment Wells would have indulged D’Oyly- Hughes, in a personality clash with one of his officers, and allowed him to put a capital ship, two destroyers, desperately needed aircraft and over 1,500 men at risk because of it. Neither do I think D’Oyly-Hughes was that vindictive, unless he was suffering from some kind of mental health problem. There was a war on, a war that was going very badly for the British. D’Oyly-Hughes had already removed Heath and I can’t think he was very high up on D’Oyly-Hughes or Wells’ list of priorities. A court martial would have been a massive distraction for D’Oyly-Hughes and his ship. Understandably, far more pressing in the minds of those making the decisions, was the task of protecting Britain from invasion and cutting off Germany’s iron ore supply.

8th June 1940

Just after lunch on the 8th June 1940 the War Cabinet met in London and Operation Paul was again on their agenda. The minutes record:

A preparatory order to carry out the operation had already been issued to C-in-C Home Fleet (Admiralty signal 0043/8)
The committee took note that the 1st Sea Lord intended to seek the authority of the War Cabinet at their meeting on the evening of the 9th June to give the final order for carrying out the operation since certain political considerations were involved.
It was agreed to instruct the secretary to draft a short memorandum setting out the nature of the orders which had been prepared for the execution of Operation Paul in order that the Foreign Office might have an opportunity of considering the political repercussions of the decision to carry out this operation.
Dudley Pound said the report had already been overtaken by events. A preparatory order to carry out the Operation Paul had already been issued by C-in-C Home Fleet.

Again, this is not entirely accurate. The preparatory order was not issued by C-in-C Home Fleet but by Pound and Churchill to the C-in-C Home Fleet. The order was also sent to the Vice Admiral Air (VAA) Lionel Wells. The War Cabinet discussion illustrates the extremely tight time-frames involved. They were also nervous about infringing Swedish neutrality and the possibility of Russia siding with Germany.

Behind the scenes, Churchill via Pound was pushing ahead. Glorious was due to reach the UK in the early hours of the 9th June 1940. Having given the preparatory order on the 8th June, Pound intended to follow this up with the final order on the 9th June. There was no time to waste.

The Sinkings

At tea time on the afternoon of Saturday 8th June1940, Glorious was spotted by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The destroyer Ardent was dispatched by Glorious to investigate. Her flashed challenge was met by German gunfire.

Glorious sent an Enemy Report to Admiral Wells in Ark Royal and the other British ships in the area warning them she was under attack. Devonshire, plotted to be as close as 32miles away during the action, received what she would later claim to be a garbled, possibly corrupt signal from Glorious faced a quandary - Did she break radio silence and go to the aid of Glorious or continue as ordered in radio silence to the UK with the King of Norway. After some discussion in Devonshire between the Admiral, King and Captain, she chose the latter.

Was the enemy report Devonshire received from Glorious really garbled? According to her ship’s log Devonshire came to action stations, increased her speed and exercised her main armament, something she hadn’t done for ten days or so and a clear indication she was aware of a surface threat. Eyewitnesses say the Admiral was later seen slumped in a corner; chain smoking convinced he would be condemned for turning his back on Glorious.

HMS Ardent and Acasta (As seen from the German Battlecruisers) lay smoke to screen Glorious from their gunfire (Courtesy of GLARAC)

Despite managing to range five Swordfish on the flight deck of Glorious, the aircraft never took off.

As the enquiry would establish, the aeroplanes were not armed. Why? Gross negligence by the ship’s Captain? Or had ground crews already begun stripping them to begin the substantial job of fitting extra fuel tanks needed for Operation Paul?

An hour and half later the battle was over, Glorious, Ardent and Acasta had all been sunk, 600 men were dead and 900 men were adrift in life rafts, only 41 would survive.

German Evidence

German naval reports emerged after the war. The Captain of Scharnhorst said of the British destroyers. (The destroyers, incidentally, displaced 1,750 tons each, the German opposition; 38,100 tons or nearly 22 times their size).

“The conduct of Ardent was particularly spirited and clever. She outmanoeuvred the fall of shot very capably, laid smoke (to shield Glorious from view) and used it with great skill, and varied her speed from 10 to 35 knots. In this way she made the task of our guns very difficult”. Firing too was made difficult for Scharnhorst against Acasta by the extremely skillful manoeuvring of the Acasta.

Acasta also hit the Scharnhorst with a torpedo, which in 1946 Captain CH Robertson, Naval Director of Tactical & Staff Duties Division described as;

“one of the finest of many heroic incidents of the War”

The damage to Scharnhorst was substantial. An engine, rudder, propeller, and rear B turret were all put out of action. The ship took on 2,500 tons of water. 53 German sailors drowned in compartments, deliberately flooded, to correct Scharnhorst’s severe list.

Acasta’s torpedo damage to Scharnhorst – the hole measured 14x6 meters

Crucially, the torpedo brought the German Operation Juno to a premature end and stopped further attacks on Ark Royal’s troop convoy, saving many more lives.

Kenneth Macksey, in his book “ Invasion” went further and sighted the torpedo hit and damage to Scharnhorst as putting an end to German plans for Operation Sealion; the invasion of Great Britain, planned for July 1940. This view is supported by AJP Taylor in his book; English History 1914 to 1945;

“In the summer of 1940 the effective German fleet was reduced to one 8 inch cruiser, two light cruisers and four destroyers. The successful withdrawal from Dunkirk and the German failure to invade England both owed something to the Norwegian campaign.

Admiral Wilhelm Marschall the German Flottenchef or fleet commander was sacked as a result of the damage to his ship and to Hitler’s plans for invasion.

9th June 1940

The Aftermath

Devonshire, the King of Norway and his entourage made it safely to the UK arriving in Glasgow on the morning of the 9th June 1940. Ark Royal and her aircraft mounted a search of the area for the German Battlecruisers. No survivors from Glorious Ardent or Acasta were rescued by the Royal Navy, those lucky enough to survive three days in Carley floats were found by Norwegian fishing boats and a German seaplane.

With the Admiralty, as yet, unaware Glorious had been sunk, Churchill, agitated at the perceived lack of action, wrote on the 9th June 1940:

“I understood from the First Sea Lord that this operation (Paul) would be carried out at once. What is the position of this? The sooner it is over the better”.

And again, on the same day (9th June 1940) Churchill wrote to General Pug Ismay:

We have been ill served over this (Operation Paul) and the operation needlessly delayed. I am very much grieved that the Admiralty have not taken care of this most important operation and tried to fit it in earlier. Now at last the moment has come when the complete evacuation of Narvik is in sight, if not already achieved and when the situation at home is improved by the rescue of the British Expeditionary Force (Dunkirk). I understood from the First Sea Lord that the operation would be carried out at once. What is the position about this? The sooner it is over the better. Thereafter the carriers can go to America to pick up aeroplanes.

The War Cabinet met at 7pm that evening (9th June 1940). The minutes record:

First Lord of the Admiralty ( A.V. Alexander who succeeded Churchill in the role) said it was proposed to carry out the Operation Paul in the near future. He added it is normal procedure to give prior notice of the intention to mine an area.

Churchill: No prior notice should be given to our intentions to lay mines outside Lulea. If attacks resulted in sinking of neutral shipping, we should express our regrets in suitable terms.

War Cabinet agreed: No prior notice should be given of our intention to carry out Operation Paul.

10th June 1940

The War Cabinet met again on the 10th June1940 by which time news of Glorious was not good;

Churchill spoke of a "grievous loss" and "consideration was given to the question whether a certain operation (Paul) should be carried out".

The Chief of the Naval Staff said that no further news had been received about the German claim to have sunk H.M.S. Glorious. He feared, however, that the report was almost certainly true.

Conclusions, H.M.S. Glorious had been accompanied by two destroyers, and it was possible that one of these had escaped. The uncertainty on this point was an argument in favour of awaiting confirmation before issuing any statement.

In discussion it was pointed out that the Germans were broadcasting that they had sunk H.M.S. Glorious and that this claim was known throughout the Fleet. In these circumstances it was felt impossible to delay further the issue of an announcement, which should be on the lines that, in the absence of any further reports, it must be presumed that H.M.S. Glorious had been sunk.

The Chief of the Naval Staff reported the results of an air reconnaissance, and consideration was given to the question whether a certain operation (Paul) should be carried out.

The “certain operation” mentioned above can only be Operation Paul. We will never know what options were discussed but having lost Glorious, it would appear Operation Paul was cancelled. It was never discussed at War Cabinet level again. Paris fell a week later, giving the Germans access to high-grade French iron ore.

17th June 1940

On the 17th June 1940 Churchill wrote to First Lord of The Admiralty, A. V. Alexander. What is interesting about his letter is he can’t even bring himself to name Glorious and instead refers to a “certain ship”. He writes:

There are several points about fleet distribution leading up to the loss of a certain ship which require examination. First, the Narvik exodus was known to be in progress by the enemy and therefore its protection against surface ships was the first charge of the Home Fleet.

How was it at this juncture that two battle cruisers, Renown and Repulse were sent off to the Faroes, entirely out of the important business that the Admiralty were carrying out from Narvik?

Perhaps you should ask the naval staff to report on this matter on which Parliament will certainly concern itself. The loss was very grievous and even more vexing is that the enemy retired without injury or interception. I am afraid it will be felt that the Navy has bungled this and certainly the Germans have had a remarkable success. Considering the very few ships they had and the enormous forces which we dispose, it is astonishing how we are bedeviled by them. I am quite sure this story will require very severe scrutiny.

Churchill was clearly very angry at having been caught out by the Germans and worried about the possible repercussions the loss of Glorious would bring and questions that would be asked. He also accuses the Navy of bungling an operation he interfered with.

Churchill also asks AV Alexander for a report from naval staff. There was surely only one man to go to for that report; Vice Admiral Wells the man who ordered HMS Glorious, Ardent & Acasta home. So where is his report? Was Churchill asking for a report he could then suppress?

Meanwhile a more palatable public explanation had to be found. The Admiralty settled on the explanation that is still given out today: Glorious left the safety of the convoy because she was an old ship and short of fuel. A story that convinced no one and further undermined the credibility of the Admiralty.

26th June 1940

The Board of Enquiry

The Board of Enquiry into the loss of HMS Glorious, Ardent and Acasta signed off its findings just eighteen days later on 26th June 1940 but oddly was confined to accounts from survivors only and not the external circumstances surrounding the loss of the ships. What happened to the “very severe scrutiny” Churchill had suggested?

The Admiralty had just lost a capital ship, two destroyers, numerous aeroplanes and over 1,500 men. You might think they would want to get to the bottom of what happened and learn the lessons from it. On the contrary, the Admiralty marked the file “Closed until 2041” (Glorious is the only aircraft carrier to have had an enquiry closed for 100 years).

What is truly bewildering is that no one appears to have asked the one man who can have shed some light on the matter, Admiral Wells, why he allowed or ordered, depending on your view, Glorious to part company with Ark Royal and the convoy.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork, the Commander of Allied Forces in Norway, affectionately known as “Baron Bung”, attached a note to the Board of Enquiry report dated 4th July 1940. The note is telling, as Glorious was ostensibly under his command at the time she was sunk. He says:

I do not propose to comment on this report. Ship was working directly under VAA (Vice Admiral Air Lionel Wells) and received her orders from him.

In other words, Cork was saying, if you’re looking for someone to blame don’t blame me. No mention of Glorious requesting permission to return to the UK for pending Courts Martial. Quite the opposite, he says Glorious received her “orders” from Wells. Wells in return had received his orders from Churchill and Pound only an hour or so before Glorious set a course for the UK. That order, sent at 0043 on the 8th June 1940, was to begin Operation Paul.

The fact that Wells did not give evidence to the Board of Enquiry or provide a Report of Proceedings into the loss of Glorious, when he held overall responsibility, is quite simply unbelievable and would suggest he was either gagged by Churchill, Pound and the Admiralty or his report was suppressed. His previous report relating to operations from April 1940 to the beginning of May 1940 runs to 100 pages and he hadn’t lost, 1,519 men, a carrier and two destroyers then. (National Archive Ref: ADM 199/479 MO 011871/40).

The only report Wells ever appears to have written (ADM 199/479 M010801/40) only confirms which radio frequencies Glorious, Ark Royal and the other ships in the convoy had been using. It runs to a grand total of 1 page. That’s it! Astonishing.

Admiral Sir William Davis (Commander of HMS Hood in 1940) wrote to Capt. Stephen Roskill on 30th July 1980 having read his Sunday Times article and asked the one question which no official report into the loss of Glorious has ever addressed;

“What on earth was Nutty Wells thinking of letting Glorious go? Surely he ought to have been brought to trial by Court Martial?”

Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS) Rear Admiral Tom Phillips was even more perplexed. His notes of the 20th June 1940;

“Why did she part company with Ark Royal? Aircraft at 10 minutes notice at 1620. No aircraft up and ship intact at 1640. I estimate Ark Royal must have been within aircraft striking distance when all this happened”

Surely these are all questions Nutty Wells could easily have dealt with? So why don’t we know the answers? Did he write a report that’s been suppressed and never published? Was Wells ever interviewed by senior officers? Was the Board of Enquiry warned off and told they could not interview him?

The Findings

Admiral Sir Lionel Victor “Nutty” Wells being presented with a Reindeer - Scapa Flow 1943.

Without the benefit of Wells’ evidence, the board of enquiry reached four major conclusions:

(a.) There were five Swordfish Torpedo Bombers on board (Glorious) which might have been used for reconnaissance; none had been in the air 12 hours prior to, or during the action.

(b). There was a lack of a proper look out on board and of precautions generally against a possible surface attack.

(c). Before the action began, the only shell at the guns was for anti-aircraft attack.

(d) All the boilers were not connected up.

The board also pointed to one external aspect;

The apparent lack any surface cover to protect the ship from the attack which she met.

(After the sinking of HMS Courageous, sister ship to Glorious, in September 1939 The Admiralty ordered a minimum of 4 escort destroyers for carrier protection, Glorious had only 2)

Responses to the findings

In response to point (a.) Sub-Lieutenant McLachlan, a survivor from Glorious, told the Board of Enquiry,

It was not usual to fly patrols once past the Faroe Islands.

Also in response to point (a.) Lieutenant Commander Hill told the Board of Enquiry,

Swordfish were ranged on the flying off deck. These had no torpedo racks fitted nor were there any bombs up or fused – they were no good.

On page 165 of his book “Carrier Glorious” John Winton refers to events on board Glorious on the 8th June;

“Everyone being out on their feet after the exertions of the past few days” but there were Squadron meetings on board Glorious at 9am on the 8th June. One pilot noticed warheads being removed from torpedoes and other armaments being struck down or stowed away. The Chief Torpedo Instructor in the ship said that they were getting a “lap ahead”.

But for what?

John Winton, unaware of Operation Paul, assumed this was being done to be ready for crew leave when the ship reached the UK. The more likely explanation is the aircrews had begun preparing the aircraft to carry the mines and long range fuel tanks for Operation Paul, itself a 24-36 hour job per aircraft.

We know from the signal sent on the 8th May 1940 (The day after D’Oyly-Hughes met with Churchill) to the Admiralty from Glorious that the ship had 12 sets of long range fuel tanks on board. The tanks had been ordered “only to Glorious” by Vice Admiral Wells.

In response to point (b.) survivors told the Board of Enquiry there was a lookout but he was not at the very top of the mast.

Point (c.) is misleading in that the only time ships had come under attack out at sea during the whole Norwegian campaign had been by air. All ships, including Glorious, therefore primarily expected enemy attack to come from the air or from submarines. Had the warnings from Bletchley Park and or the Norwegian coastal watchers been passed on to Glorious and other allied ships in the area, they may have been better prepared for a surface threat.

In answer to point (d.). Glorious was zigzagging and steaming at 17 knots, the correct speed at which to keep her safe from U-boat attack, the only threat she thought likely at this point. Her boilers had all been connected up just a few hours previously when she was steaming at full speed to land on the Hurricanes.

In conclusion, the ship was not flying patrols because it appears to have become standard practice not to do so in the area she was sailing through at the time of the attack. There was a lookout, admittedly, had the lookout been at the highest point of the mast, Glorious might have sighted the enemy sooner. The ship was prepared for air attack and was sailing at the correct speed, with enough boilers connected, to prevent submarine attack. D’Oyly-Hughes, it appears, was acting no differently to the captain of Ark Royal, had he been in the same situation.

Having said that, captains are usually blamed if they lose their ship and in considering whether D’Oyly-Hughes should be posthumously court martialed, the Admiralty was not speaking out of turn. The irony though is the suggestion of court martial came from Dudley Pound the very man, along with Churchill, who put the ships in harm’s way in the first place.

Pounds’ hand written note on the Board of Enquiry reads “Glorious seems to have forgotten she was a Man o’ War” laying the blame squarely at D’Oyly-Hughes’s door.

It is also worth returning here to Churchill’s words in “The Gathering Storm” and the explanation for the sinkings;

The Glorious had been detached earlier that morning to proceed home independently owing to shortage of fuel, and by now was nearly 200 miles ahead of the main convoy. This explanation is not convincing. The Glorious presumably had enough fuel to steam at the speed of the convoy. All should have kept together.

In the intervening years D’Oyly-Hughes has become a much more controversial figure than he was on the 8th June 1940. Many have concluded he was a loose cannon who did as he pleased and to hell with the consequences. He didn’t, he did what he was told to do. D’Oyly-Hughes clearly fell out with his two senior flying officers but was not responsible for the loss of his ship. He was in the wrong place at the wrong time and that was not of his doing. D’Oyly-Hughes was carrying out the orders he had been given.

Questions in the House

The MP for Ipswich, Richard Stokes, smelt a rat too and raised questions in the House of Commons. He made Churchill his principal political target. He argued that had RAF Coastal Command been informed of the evacuation they could have provided air cover and would almost certainly have spotted the German ships. He argued Churchill had ordered Glorious’s cruiser, Devonshire to bring home the King of Norway and that Churchill had gone over Admirals’ heads and sent a direct order for Glorious to return home.

Stokes was on to something. Of course, the missing piece in his argument was Operation Paul and without that, he failed to land the killer blow. Stokes’ instinct though was right. He later claimed he discussed the incident with Dudley Pound, shortly before his death, and Pound agreed much of it was true.

Richard Stokes MP for Ipswich photographed in April 1940 (© National Portrait Gallery)

7th November 1940

Commander Robert Tatton Bower RN MP possibly came even closer to the truth. During the House of Commons debate into the loss of Glorious on 7th November 1940, he grilled the then First Lord of The Admiralty, AV Alexander. Bower was in a unique position, as a sitting MP but also a serving naval intelligence officer with access to highly sensitive, confidential information.

Bower had seen a signal, a signal he could only have seen in his capacity of a naval officer.

First Lord AV Alexander claimed in the debate

“It would put any First Lord into an impossible situation to have to explain to a junior Naval Officer, because he was a member of parliament, what was the reason for a Cabinet decision referred to in a naval signal which he would never have seen unless he was on the naval staff”.

This signal would appear to refer to Operation Paul. However, given the country was at war Bower had pushed it as far as he could in a public forum.

The Head of Military Branch II, Richard Royle Powell, put a stop to any official public report on the loss of Glorious in response to Stokes’ questions;

"A full report at this date would make very dismal reading and would invite Mr. Stokes or other MPs to ask why this or that was not done” said Powell.

Commander Robert Tatton Bower RN MP for Cleveland photographed in 1936 (©National Portrait Gallery)

The Victoria Crosses

The Admiralty also discussed the recommendations of posthumous VC’s for the destroyer captains, Commander Charles Glasfurd and Lt Cdr. JF “Ben” Barker. They concluded the awards could not be made due to the lack of eye-witness accounts from senior British officers, all killed in the action.

They considered the VC’s again after the war, when German Naval Intelligence (B-Dienst) reports emerged detailing the outstanding bravery of the two destroyers in trying to protect Glorious from the two battlecruisers.

Commander Schubert of Scharnhorst:

“Not only the tactical handling but the audacity and pluck of the destroyers was outstanding. Every officer taking part in the action was of the same opinion. The destroyers put their utmost into the task, although, in their position, success was impossible from the start”.

The British establishment, it seems, wanted the story buried and forgotten. In reconsidering the VC recommendations when the German evidence came to light after the war, the Secretary of the Honours and Awards Committee’s shameful statement below is clear, deserving or not, immortalising the loss of HMS Glorious Ardent & Acasta by awarding VC’s to the destroyer captains was not an option;

“If justice demands revision of Commander Glasfurd’s recognition, this must be weighed against the fact that to re-open the case will also, no doubt, re-open the Enquiry”.

You wonder what possible business it was of the gallantry and awards committee to be worrying about the re-opening of naval enquiries, but it then it becomes blindingly obvious when you realise the new secretary of the awards committee in 1946 was none other than; Sir Edward Bridges – Churchill’s very own Cabinet Secretary throughout the war and then, of course, the plot thickens.

Lieutenant Commander John Frederick “Ben” Barker DSC – C/O of HMS Ardent

Commander Charles Eric Glasfurd – C/O of HMS Acasta

8th November 1940

On the 8th November 1940 the day after the debate in the commons, Biddy Glasfurd, the widow of Charles Glasfurd, Acasta’s captain, wrote to Commander Bower MP for help, having been denied access to the only survivor from her husband’s ship by the Admiralty ;

My husband, Commander CE Glasfurd, was in command of HMS Acasta, which as you know, was one of the destroyers that went down with the “Glorious”. I naturally wished to know if the sole survivor of the Acasta, had seen my husband wounded or anything he might have known about him.

The Admiralty refused to give me the address of the survivor, but after a great deal of trouble I found him by myself. If all three of these ships had behaved in a cowardly manner, then one could understand the present attitude of the Admiralty, and this I am afraid is what the average person must think. I trust that you will raise this matter again, until a satisfactory statement is given.

It is heart-breaking that Mrs Glasfurd should have felt people might think her husband and his ship’s company to be cowards when they put up such a brave fight against such overwhelming odds. That she should be frozen out by the Admiralty and unable to seek comfort from the one witness who could tell of her husband’s last moments seems unbearably cruel. What was the Admiralty so afraid of and why nearly 80 years later are we still waiting for that satisfactory statement?

30th July 1963

Twenty three years later on the 30th July 1963 page 10 of a 16 page folder marked “Operation Paul” was removed from Churchill’s Chartwell Trust papers, bequeathed to the nation, on the grounds of national security. Why was it removed? Did it name HMS Glorious? A response from the government’s Cabinet Office to a freedom of information request in 2013 established the missing page has been “lost”.

Official Naval War Historian, Stephen Roskill’s article for the Sunday Times in 1980 turned D’Oyly-Hughes into the villain of the piece, the man who fell out with his senior flying staff, who was arrogant, unhinged, and had little time or respect for naval aviation, said Roskill.

D’Oyly-Hughes’s family responded in a letter to the Sunday Times by saying he learnt to fly between the wars, and found the quality of some of his officers in Glorious to;

“Have the feeling of endlessly kicking a ball which proved to be half full of argumentative soggy cotton wool”.

They added it was Wells who ordered the ship to return to the UK (and not D’Oyly-Hughes who took his ship off in some high-handed way, putting it in danger).

Postscript

So here we are nearly 80 years later, yes, the closed 2041 Board of Enquiry file is now open, when you read it you wonder why it was closed for so long, it reveals so little. The truth is still attended by a bodyguard of lies.

Churchill found the shortage of fuel theory to be unconvincing and so, it seems, does everyone else.

The court martial theory also has a hollow ring to it.

Which leaves Churchill’s cherished Operation Paul, an operation he and his War Cabinet lavished time, attention and resources on at critical moment in Britain’s fortunes .

I return to Prof. Andrew Lambert words:

“As I read it the probability of your version is too high to be mere coincidence, all the pieces line up and the men are all meeting in the right order. It is about time this gap in the record was closed”

Confirmation of this by the Ministry of Defence is long overdue, but let’s be optimistic and live in hope the Naval Historical Branch (Keepers of the Royal Navy’s historical archive) might break with the tradition of secrecy and actually tell us what happened by releasing Admiral Well’s report. There does seem to be very little point in sticking to a story (shortage of fuel) that no one believes. Perpetuating the lies of those who have come before you, as it has chosen to do in the past, only serves to undermine the credibility of the NHB.

This is not the story of incompetence some would have us believe. To the shame of our own Admiralty, had it not been for the admiration of their German counterparts we may never have known just how brave the men of HMS Glorious Ardent & Acasta were. Those men, our loved ones, deserve their rightful place in history and to be allowed to finally rest in peace.